For Sale: Trade Policy in Majoritarian Systems by Fredriksson, Per G. et al.
University of Connecticut
OpenCommons@UConn
Economics Working Papers Department of Economics
June 2008
For Sale: Trade Policy in Majoritarian Systems
Per G. Fredriksson
University of Louisville
Xenia Matschke
University of Connecticut
Jenny Minier
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/econ_wpapers
Recommended Citation
Fredriksson, Per G.; Matschke, Xenia; and Minier, Jenny, "For Sale: Trade Policy in Majoritarian Systems" (2008). Economics Working
Papers. 200820.
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/econ_wpapers/200820
Department of Economics Working Paper Series
For Sale: Trade Policy in Majoritarian Systems
Per G. Fredriksson
University of Louisville
Xenia Matschke
University of Connecticut
Jenny Minier
University of Kentucky
Working Paper 2008-20
June 2008
341 Mansfield Road, Unit 1063
Storrs, CT 06269–1063
Phone: (860) 486–3022
Fax: (860) 486–4463
http://www.econ.uconn.edu/
This working paper is indexed on RePEc, http://repec.org/
Abstract
We provide a theory of trade policy determination that incorporates the protec-
tionist bias inherent in majoritarian systems, suggested by Grossman and Helpman
(2005). The prediction that emerges is that in majoritarian systems, the majority
party favors industries located disproportionately in majority districts. We test
this prediction using U.S. tariff data from 1993, and House campaign contribution
data from two electoral cycles. We find evidence of a protectionist bias due to
majoritarian system politics that is comparable in magnitude to the payoff from
being an organized industry.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: F13
We would like to thank Scott Baier, Josh Ederington, Jose Fernandez, Martin
Gassebner, Noel Gaston, Angeliki Kourelis, Dani Rodrik and participants at the
SEA meetings in Charleston for helpful comments and discussion, Alessandro
Nicita for providing the import elasticity data, and Jessie Roberts for valuable
research assistance. Any errors are our own.
 2
“to the victors belong the spoils” 
 
-- Republican majority leader Richard Armey, commenting on reports that the Republican party 
re-directed spending to Republican districts after the 1994 election.1 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In majoritarian electoral systems such as the U.S., politics is particularly grounded in local 
interests (Milesi-Feretti, Perotti, and Rostagno, 2002). Grossman and Helpman (henceforth, G-H) 
(2005) argue that the pattern of protectionism will be influenced by the majority legislation’s home 
districts’ industry structure. We provide a simple theory of the determination of trade policy that 
merges G-H’s (2005) view of majoritarian system trade politics with the lobbying approach pioneered 
by G-H (1994).  
In our model, the majority delegates consider the welfare of their own home districts (only), 
simultaneously as organized industry lobby groups offer the majority delegation campaign 
contributions in return for favorable trade policies. Our approach facilitates a comparison of the 
influence of electoral rules (majoritarian system) relative to the impact of lobbying. The novel 
predictions are: (i) if an industry is relatively concentrated in majority districts, it receives positive 
protection (even without an organized lobby); (ii) on the other hand, industries primarily located in 
minority districts suffer from lower, even negative, trade protection.  
We test these predictions using a newly assembled unique data set with U.S. tariff data for 332 
manufacturing industries in 1993 and House campaign contributions data from the 1989-90 and 1991-
92 electoral cycles. Only political contributions to the majority party (the Democrats during this sample 
period) are considered, consistent with our theory. Industry-level employment by state is used to 
construct the extent of majority bias, i.e., the extent to which the majority party represents each 
industry. All explanatory variables are instrumented similarly to Goldberg and Maggi (1999) (G-M), 
                                                 
1 Quoted by David Pace, “1994 Shift Seen to Aid GOP Areas,” The Boston Globe, August 6, 2002, page A5 (reported by 
Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2006).  
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Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) (G-B), Eicher and Osang (2002), and Matschke and Sherlund 
(2006).2  
Using a two-step GMM approach, we find estimates broadly consistent with the model’s 
predictions. The majority bias in U.S. trade policy is of a magnitude comparable to the payoff from 
being an organized industry. The predicted tariff for an industry located exclusively in majority 
districts is 6.1 percentage points higher than for an industry entirely situated in minority districts, while 
the predicted tariff for an organized industry is 2.4 percentage points higher than for an unorganized 
industry. The results are robust across three lobby group organization classification methods.  
To our knowledge, no empirical study exists of the impact of majoritarian systems on trade 
policy outcomes as suggested by Grossman and Helpman (2005). Our results indicate that electoral 
rules are an important determinant of trade policy. Thus, our paper complements, e.g., Lizzeri and 
Persico (2001), Milesi-Feretti, Perotti, and Rostagno (2002), and Persson and Tabellini (2004), who 
found policy effects of electoral rules on public spending.3  
The paper is organized as follows. Section II sets up the theoretical model and derives the 
predictions. Section III describes the data. Section IV outlines the empirical approach and reports the 
results. Section V concludes. Appendix A provides further details on variable construction. 
 
II. Model 
A small open economy has individuals living in N geographically separate political districts 
indexed by j. The population is normalized to unity. Each individual i in this economy consumes n+1 
goods, and has quasi-linear preferences given by ,)(
1
0 ∑
=
+
n
g
i
g
i xux  where ix0  represents i’s consumption 
of the numeraire good 0, and (.)u  is a differentiable and strictly concave function of consumption igx  
                                                 
2 Gawande and Krishna (2003) provide an excellent survey of the empirical literature on the political economy of trade 
policy. 
3 See Persson and Tabellini (2003) for an extensive survey of the related literature. 
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of good g, }.,...,2,1{ ng ∈  Good 0 has world and domestic price equal to unity, while other goods g 
have world and domestic prices wgp  and ,gp  respectively. Sector g is protected by a specific import 
tariff or export subsidy; i.e. .g
w
gg tpp +=  
Individual i  living in district j with budget ijE  spends ∑
=
n
g
ggg pdp
1
)(  on non-numeraire goods, 
where demand for good g is given by [ ] ;)(')( 1−= ggg xupd  we drop individual-specific superscripts 
(consumption quantities of all non-numeraire goods and associated consumer surplus are equal across 
individuals).  The remaining budget share is spent on good 0; this amount is assumed positive.  
Good 0 is produced from labor only with constant returns to scale and an input-output coefficient 
equal to unity; assuming positive production, the wage rate equals one. Good g  requires labor and a 
sector specific input. With a fixed wage rate, the aggregate factor reward in sector g, )( gg pπ , depends 
on gp  only. Each individual receives wage income. The consumer surplus derived from good g 
consumption equals [ ] )()()( ggggggg pdppdups −≡ . Tariff revenue collected in sector g equals 
)()()( gg
w
gggg pmpppr −= , where [ ])()()( gggggg pXpdpm −=  is the net import demand function, 
and )(')( gggg ppX π=  is the domestic supply of good g, by Hotelling’s Lemma.  
Individuals may own sector-specific input factors in at most one sector g. In some or all of the n 
sectors, denoted by L, the factor owners organize national lobby groups incorporating capital owners 
across districts. In organized sectors, sector g’s lobby seeks to influence trade policy by offering 
campaign contribution schedules )( gg pC  to the majority legislative delegation (G-H, 1994). With 
highly concentrated ownership, factor owners value only factor reward. Thus, the gross welfare of the 
sector g lobby equals  
).()( gggg ppW π≡  (1) 
 5
Denote the district j population share by βj, and the share of industry g capital located in district j 
by αjg.  Then, the aggregate income level of district j equals 
∑ ∑
= =
++=
n
g
n
g
ggjggjgjj prpY
1 1
),()( βπαβ  (2) 
where the RHS terms equal labor income, capital income, and net transfer income, respectively. 
Adding consumer surplus to Eqn. (2) yields district j residents’ aggregate social welfare level,  
∑ ∑
= =
+++=
n
g
n
g
ggggjggjgj
A
j psprpW
1 1
)].()([)( βπαβ  (3) 
Each district j is represented by one single legislator who is affiliated with either the majority or 
minority party.  Majority delegation legislators value average citizen welfare in their home districts. 
This assumption receives empirical support from the literature on the relationship between distribution 
of public funds and party control. Levitt and Snyder (1995) report that when the Democrats had a 
majority in Congress, federal spending in an area increased with its Democratic vote. Ansolabehere and 
Snyder (2006) find that jurisdictions providing the largest vote share to the incumbent party receive the 
highest shares of state transfers to local government. Moreover, the distribution of funds is redirected 
towards the new governing party’s core supporters as a result of a change in the state government.4 For 
example, Joanis (2007) shows that in Québec, Canada, the geographic allocation of spending is highly 
dependent on districts’ party loyalties.  
The majority party is represented by ≥(N/2 + 1) legislators; the set of such legislators is denoted 
by K. Majority party representatives may compensate each other with political side payments or inter-
temporal trades; they maximize their joint welfare,   
,)( ∑∑
∈∈
+=
Kj
A
j
Lg
gg
M WapCW  (4) 
where the weight 0>a  is the majority legislators’ relative weight on social welfare.  
                                                 
4 Ansolabehere and Snyder (2006) argue that this spending strategy raises turnout. 
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The equilibrium trade policy is determined as the outcome of a two-stage, non-cooperative game. 
In stage one, each organized lobby g∈ L simultaneously and non-cooperatively offers the legislative 
majority a contribution schedule ),( gg pC  taking the other lobbies’ strategies as given. In stage two, the 
legislative majority selects its favored trade policy and collects the associated contribution from each 
organized lobby. The lobbies are assumed not to renege on their promises in this stage. The political 
equilibrium characterization and derivation is standard (G-H, 1994); we omit this to conserve space. 
We now derive the equilibrium trade policy. Let “*” denote an equilibrium value, and let gδ be an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if firms in sector g are organized, and zero otherwise. Summing Eqns. (3) 
and (4) over all legislators in K, the equilibrium characterization equals   
,,0)(')()( *** gpmtXapX
Kj
gggj
Kj
jjggggg ∀=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−+ ∑∑
∈∈
ββαδ  (5) 
which yields   
.,
)('
)(
)(
*
*
* g
pm
pX
a
a
t
gg
gg
Kj
j
Kj
jjgg
g ∀−
−+
= ∑
∑
∈
∈
β
βαδ
 (6) 
Tariff protection is a function of industry size (Xg) and the slope of the import demand function 
( 'gm ).  Sector g unambiguously receives a positive level of protection if the majority party districts’ 
share of sector g capital is greater than the population share of these districts, ∑∑
∈∈
>
Kj
j
Kj
jg βα . 
Moreover, if the sector lobby is organized )1( =gδ , sector g receives positive protection, even if these 
shares are exactly equal. Finally, even if the majority districts’ share of sector g capital is smaller than 
their population share, sector g may receive positive protection due to lobbying. This occurs only if the 
majority legislation values campaign contributions sufficiently highly relative to social welfare (low a).  
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III. Data 
To estimate the model and test the above predictions, we use 1993 data on U.S. manufacturing 
industries. Since this represents a substantial update over much of the previous empirical G-H 
literature, our results are not directly comparable. Variable construction is discussed further in 
Appendix A. 
Our measure of trade protection is tariffs, following the theory. Our tariff and import data come 
from Schott’s (2007) trade database. Data on other industry characteristics are primarily from the 
Bartelsman, Becker, and Gray (2000) NBER productivity database. The import demand elasticity 
measures come from Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2006). Import demand elasticities are estimated by 
industry at the 6-digit HS level, which we concord to SIC4 based on import weights (see Appendix 
A.II).   
We use contributions to House campaigns during the 1989-90 and 1991-92 election cycles to 
classify industries as organized, and experiment with alternative classification methods (described 
further in Appendix A.IV), based on G-B, G-M, and Ederington and Minier (2008) (henceforth, E-M). 
We present results for all three; they are not particularly dependent on the classification method used. 
The G-M classification involves identifying a break in the distribution of the contributions data, while 
G-B involves regressing contributions data on 2-digit industry dummy variables interacted with 
bilateral import penetration data for trading partners and interpreting the coefficient estimates on these 
interaction terms.  Finally, E-M criticize the practice of considering some industries that make positive 
contributions as unorganized, so we allow all industries with positive contributions to be considered 
organized. Since our focus is on majority bias in trade policy, we use contributions to Democratic 
(majority) House candidates only.  
We use state-level data to construct the variables measuring the extent to which an industry is 
represented by the majority party. County Business Patterns provides data on industry-level 
employment by state; we follow Busch and Reinhardt (2000) in imputing data as described in 
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Appendix A.III. As an estimate of (αjg – βj), we use the difference between the percentage of an 
industry’s employment located in a given state and the population share of that state (from the 1990 
Census). This gives a measure of the extent to which an industry is over-represented (as measured by 
employment) in a state. 
In the model, each district is represented by one legislator, and (αjg – βj) is summed over the 
majority districts. We do not have sufficiently rich data at the electoral district level, so we use states as 
the regional unit. States are usually represented by several legislators who may belong to different 
parties. We present results for two alternative summations over majority districts: the first includes 
only those states in which the House delegation is over 50% Democratic (the majority party in 1993); 
and the second weights each state by the percentage of its House delegation that is Democratic.5 
 
IV. Empirical Approach 
The econometric model is derived from Eqn. (6), which we rewrite in terms of observables 
 g
Kj
j
g
g
Kj
j
g
gg X
z
X
a
mt ~
~~'~* ∑∑
∈∈
+= ββ
δ
, (7)  
where gX
~  is the value of industry shipments, and '~* ggmt  can be calculated by noting that 
)~1/(~~)(''~ **** gggggggggg tmetppmtmt +=−=  where gt~  is the ad-valorem tariff rate in the industry, gm~  is the 
value of imports, and ge is the absolute value of the price elasticity of import demand. Finally, 
∑
∈
−=
Kj
jjggz )(~ βα  is our measure of the extent to which the industry is located in majority districts.  
To simplify the interpretation of the coefficient estimates, we define ∑
∈
=
Kj
jgg XX β/~ˆ .  Thus, our 
estimating equation becomes:  
                                                 
5 Results are robust to summing over states with at least 50% Democratic representation (12 states had exactly 50% 
Democratic representation in 1993). 
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 ,ˆ~ˆ'~ 210
*
ggggggg XzXmt εγδγγ +++=  (8) 
where, according to our derivations, γ2=1.6  Thus, our testable prediction is that the marginal impact of 
industry size on tariff protection should be conditional on the proportion of the industry located in 
majority districts.  Intuitively, greater industry production in majority districts is valued more highly in 
the government’s welfare function. Thus, the marginal impact of industry production on tariff 
protection is increasing in the majority representation of the industry.   
A standard complication that arises in such G-H estimation is that the value of shipments (and 
perhaps also whether an industry is organized) is endogenously determined, requiring instrumental 
variables estimation. Thus, we estimate the above specification using two-step optimal GMM. The 
instruments for our explanatory variables gg Xˆδ and gg Xz ˆ~ are comparable to those in G-M, G-B, 
Matschke and Sherlund (2006), and Matschke (2008):  physical capital’s share of output, industry 
concentration (8-firm concentration ratio; Herfindahl-Hirschman index), industry unemployment rate, 
and the value of the total real capital stock. In addition, we also use the majority variable gz~ as 
instrument since this variable is presumably exogenous; results do not differ significantly when also 
utilizing δg as instrument.  
Estimating the above specification requires constructing measures for both the extent of majority 
representation of an industry, gz~ , and the organization, δg, of the industry.  Details are provided in 
Appendix A; we present results for two alternative definitions of gz~ and three classifications of δg. The 
G-H model itself provides little guidance about classifying industries into organized/unorganized. First, 
following G-M, we identify a noticeable split in the data between (Democratic) House contributions; 
the results based on this approach are labeled GM in Table 1, implying that 69.6% of industries in our 
sample are classified as organized.7  Second, following the procedure used by G-B, we classify 64.5% 
                                                 
6 The other predictions of the G-H model are that γ0 = 0 and γ1>0. We are less concerned with testing the former prediction. 
7 Results are very similar when other feasible cutoffs are used (we consider seven alternatives). 
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of the sample as organized.8 Finally, we also run a specification treating all industries with positive 
contributions as organized, labeled EM in Table 1, which results in 96.7% classified as organized 
(focusing only on contributions to Democrats in 1992).  
The coefficient estimates in Table 1 are supportive of our empirical prediction of a majority bias 
in U.S. tariff policy. Specifically, we find that our estimate of γ2 is positive and statistically significant 
in all specifications. This is consistent with our prediction that industries located primarily in majority 
districts are favored in the political process. This result is robust to the method used to characterize 
politically organized industries. 
In addition, the estimated effect of being represented by the majority party is fairly large in 
magnitude, and comparable to the well-established benefit from being an organized industry.  Taking 
the EM estimates from Panel A, for example, we compute the predicted tariff ( gt
~ ) based on the means 
of all other variables. The predicted increase for an industry that switched from being located 
exclusively in minority districts to being located exclusively in majority districts is 6.1 percentage 
points, while the predicted tariff increase for an industry that switched from unorganized to organized 
is 2.4 percentage points.9 
While our results are supportive of majority bias being a significant determinant of trade policy, 
they are not completely supportive of the G-H model with majority bias.  Specifically, contrary to our 
specification, γ0>0 (the constant term is not zero), and the estimate of γ1 implies a high value for a, 
suggesting that the government places a low weight on lobby contributions compared to social welfare. 
This finding is common in the literature (see, for example, G-B; Mitra, Thomakos, and Ulubaşoğlu, 
2002).10 The puzzle of a high a is accompanied by the statistical rejection of the theoretical prediction 
that γ2 is equal to unity. The value of γ2 is statistically different from zero, but small, suggesting that 
                                                 
8 Despite the similarity in the percentage of industries classified as organized, the correlation between the two measures is 
only 0.34. 
9 The mean tariff in the sample is 5.5%, with a standard deviation of 3.9%. 
10 Our approach may provide a partial explanation for this finding, however, since the majority legislation here values only 
majority district welfare.  
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majority representation of an industry plays a role, but is less important for trade policy than predicted 
by the model. Thus, our results can only be interpreted as evidence that both representation by the 
majority party and lobbying influence are significant determinants of trade protection, but not as 
empirical confirmation of the GH framework with regard to tariff policy.  
 
V. Conclusion 
We have incorporated majority bias, as suggested by Grossman and Helpman (2005), into a 
standard Protection-for-Sale model. Trade policy is determined by the majority legislative delegation, 
which cares about domestic majority-district welfare as well as campaign contributions. In this case, in 
addition to the industry’s lobbying influence, the extent to which the industry is concentrated in 
majority districts matters for trade policy. If an industry’s capital share in majority districts exceeds the 
districts’ population share, it will receive positive protection even if it does not have an active lobby. 
Industries that are only weakly represented in majority districts receive lower trade protection.  
We test these predictions using a newly assembled data set of U.S. manufacturing industries in 
1993, using tariffs as the measure of trade protection. The results are supportive of the theoretical 
model in the sense that both the coefficients for the standard Protection-for-Sale lobbying variable and 
the majority bias variable are statistically significant and of the theoretically predicted signs. We 
conclude that the structure of the legislative decision-making process – in addition to lobbying 
influence – matters for the determination of trade policy.  
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Appendix A: Data 
I.  Majority Representation Variable 
We constructed a series of variables measuring the extent of an industry’s majority 
representation as follows. For each state, the difference between the percentage of industry 
employment located in that state and the population share of that state is computed; this is our measure 
of (αjg – βj). See Section III of this Appendix for a description of the construction of industry 
employment by state. 
For Maj_over50, this measure is summed over only those states in which more than 50% of the 
House delegation is in the majority party. 
For Maj_50, this measure is summed over only those states in which at least 50% of the House 
delegation is in the majority party. 
For Maj_pct, this measure is summed over all states, weighted by the percentage of the state’s 
House delegation from the majority party. 
The construction of the sum of betas is constructed analogously in each case.  For Maj_over50, 
this is the sum of the population shares of the states with more than 50% majority-party 
Representatives (∑βj=0.78).  For Maj_50, this is the sum of the population shares of the states with at 
least 50% majority-party Representatives (∑βj=0.90).  For Maj_pct, we weight the population share of 
each state by its percentage of majority-party Representatives (∑βj=0.52). 
 
Table A1-A: Industries with highest majority representation, 1993 
 
SIC 
 
Description 
 
Value of 
Maj_over50
 
Value of 
Maj_pct 
States with highest 
employment relative to 
population 
2895 Carbon black 0.22  MI (13.6), OH (11.4) 
2067 Chewing gum 0.22  IL (11.3) 
2252 Hosiery, n.e.c. 0.20  NC (21.3), AL (10.1) 
3996 Linoleum, asphalt-felted base, and 
other hard surface floor coverings, 
n.e.c. 
0.20  NJ (9.1) 
3795 Tanks and tank components 0.20  MI (6.9) 
2076 Vegetable oil mills, except corn, 
cottonseed, and soybean 
 0.18 ND (120.6), MT (22.1) 
3334 Primary production of aluminum  0.14 MT (20.5), WA (14.2) 
2436 Softwood veneer and plywood  0.11 OR (26.1), MT (13.4) 
2074 Cottonseed oil mills  0.10 MS (19.6), AR (10.3) 
2512 Wood household furniture, 
upholstered 
 0.09 MS (18.0), NC (11.1) 
Notes: The Democratic party had the Congressional majority in both houses in 1993. The numbers following the states give 
the ratio of the percentage of industry employment in that state to the population share of that state. The states in the table 
were represented by the following percentages of Democrats (the majority party) in their House delegation in 1993: MI 
(63%), OH (53%), IL (60%), NC (67%), AL (57%), NJ (54%), ND (100%), MT (100%), WA (89%), OR (80%), MS 
(100%), AR (50%). 
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Table A1-B: Industries with lowest majority representation, 1993 
 
SIC 
 
Description 
 
Value of 
Maj_over50
 
Value of 
Maj_pct 
States with highest 
employment relative to 
population 
2874 Phosphatic fertilizers -0.43 -0.09 ID (20.9), WY (10.8) 
3961 Costume jewelry & costume 
novelties, except precious metal 
-0.37  RI (104.4) 
3484 Small arms -0.36  VT (25.0), NH (17.6) 
2083 Malt -0.30  WI (25.6), ND (18.4) 
3331 Primary smelting & refining of 
copper 
-0.28  NM (25.8), AZ (23.2), UT 
(20.5) 
3633 Household laundry equipment  -0.10 IA (22.1) 
2046 Wet corn milling  -0.08 IA (26.4) 
3951 Pens, mechanical pencils, & parts  -0.06 RI (26.4) 
2043 Cereal breakfast foods  -0.05 IA (8.4), NE (8.0) 
Notes: See notes to Table A1-A. The states in the table were represented by the following percentages of Democrats (the 
majority party) in their House delegation in 1993: ID (50%), WY (0%), RI (50%), VT (0%), NH (50%), WI (50%), ND 
(100%), NM (33%), AZ (50%), UT (67%), IA (20%), NE (33%). 
 
II.  Import Demand Elasticities 
Import demand elasticities at the HS6 level are taken from the updated version of Kee et al. (2006). We 
assign this elasticity to each associated HS10 industry (a concordance exists only from HS10 to SIC4).  
Using imports from 1993 (from Robert Feenstra’s website) as weights, we then concord from HS10 to 
SIC4, using the concordance from Peter Schott’s website. (Any HS6 with missing elasticity is excluded 
from the industry total for calculating the weights, so that the weights sum to one for each industry).  
This yields import demand elasticity estimates for 374 manufacturing industries. 
Table A2: Import Demand Elasticities 
Most elastic import demand Least elastic import demand 
SIC  Elasticity SIC  Elasticity 
 
3446 
Architectural and ornamental 
metal work 
 
-18.6 
 
2951 
Asphalt paving mixtures and 
blocks 
 
-0.16 
2631 Paperboard mills -13.4 2067 Chewing gum -0.16 
2111 Cigarettes -10.5 3713 Truck and bus bodies -0.31 
2436 Softwood veneer and plywood -8.90 2761 Manifold business forms -0.35 
2043 Cereal breakfast foods -8.87 3221 Glass containers -0.36 
 
 
III. State-Level Employment by Industry 
County Business Patterns gives, for each state, employment by 4-digit SIC. Since many observations 
are censored, it also gives the number of establishments in various size classes. These data are also 
available at the national level (with far fewer censored observations). Following Busch and Reinhardt 
(2000), for each industry, we compute the mean establishment size at the national level for each size 
class. Then, for each state, we estimate total employment by industry using the national industry 
averages for each size class, and the number of firms in each size class by state. Following Busch and 
Reinhardt, we use the imputed data even when the actual data are not censored. The percentage of 
industry employment in each state is estimated using the sum across states as the denominator (so that 
the percentages sum to one for each industry). 
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IV. Organized Industries 
For all classifications, we use contributions only to Democrats (the majority party) running for the 
House of Representatives. Results do not differ substantially when we use contributions to all 
candidates: the correlation between contributions to Democrats and total contributions in the 
representative 1991-92 cycle is 0.98. 
 
G-M: For the 1991-92 electoral cycle, we identify significant breaks in the distribution of industry-
level contributions, and of contributions scaled by industry shipments. We consider 8 possible 
classifications, ranging from classifying all industries with positive contributions as organized 
(resulting in 321 organized and 11 unorganized industries) to a break based on contributions scaled by 
shipments between 3.96 and 4.22 (79 organized and 253 unorganized). The results reported in Table 1 
are based on a noticeable split in the data between (Democratic) House contributions of $21,400 and 
$25,367. 
 
G-B: We use contributions to Democratic House candidates scaled by industry value shipments in 
1989-90 and 1991-92. These (4-digit) industry-level contributions are regressed on 2-digit industry 
dummy variables interacted with bilateral import penetration data for each of five trading partners 
(France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the U.K.). An industry is “organized” with respect to a trading 
partner if the coefficient estimate on the interaction term is positive.  This is repeated for each of the 
trading partners; an industry is classified as “organized” if it is organized with respect to any trading 
partner. This results in 118 unorganized and 214 organized industries. 
 
E-M: All industries with positive contributions are organized. 
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Table 1: Coefficient Estimates 
 GM GB EM 
Panel A: Maj_over50 
   γ0 19.9 (7.21)*** 19.2 (8.03)** 15.2 (7.75)*
   γ1 0.006 (0.001)*** 0.006 (0.001)*** 0.005 (0.001)***
   γ2 0.017 (0.006)*** 0.015 (0.007)** 0.013 (0.006)**
p-value for Hansen’s J 0.06 0.14 0.14 
First stage F-statistics: 
   gg Xˆδ  10.77 9.25 13.42 
   gg Xz ˆ~  7.41 7.41 7.41 
Panel B: Maj_pct 
   γ0 18.0 (8.55)**   16.8 (9.66)* 13.8 (9.05)  
   γ1 0.004 (0.001)*** 0.004 (0.001)*** 0.004 (0.001)***
   γ2 0.062 (0.018)*** 0.056 (0.019)*** 0.052 (0.017)***
p-value for Hansen’s J 0.12 0.22 0.23 
First stage F-statistics: 
   gg Xˆδ  9.02 7.45 9.93 
   gg Xz ˆ~  13.58 13.58 13.58 
Percent Organized: 69.6 64.5 96.7 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% level, 
respectively. GM/GB/EM refers to the method used to classify industries into organized/unorganized.  For the summation 
of (αjg – βj) over majority states, Maj_over50 includes all states with over 50% Democrats (majority party) in the House 
delegation; Maj_pct weights all states by the percentage of Democrats in their House delegation. The number of 
observations in each regression is 332.  First-stage F-statistics are heteroskedasticity-robust. 
 
 
 
 
 
